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ADDRESS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D ., MONTANA)
at the

1971 EISENHOWER SYMPOSIUM, THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND
Thursday, November 18, 1971, 8:00 p.m.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION :

POWER IN TRANSITION

I am delighted to find myself delivering the benediction
at these proceedings .

It is an uncommon experience.

The last

word is something that is rarely reserved for the Leadership in
a Senate of unlimited debate,
Notwithstanding this built- in propensity for talk,
however, the Senate has
paet few weeka .

a~ted

with unusual dispatch during the

While this symposium has pondered the dilemmas

0f power, the Senate has sought to resolve several of them.
With regard to

V~et

vcted first to establish a

Nam, for example, the Senate

nation~l

policy cf full withdrawal
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within six months .

Later, at the insistence of the House, which

had an assist from the Administration, the specific time span
was removed and full withdrawal was accepted only as a Congressional rather than a national policy.

Still later, in other

legislation, and with the reluctant concurrence of the House
and the Administration, the Senate's insistence on full withdrawal from Viet Nam was established as national policy but
still without a opecific withdrawal date.

Finally, in a foreign

aid bill, the Senate is making one more effort to restate its
pristine

a~d

more emphatic position on Viet Nem, that is,

withdrawal within six

f~ll

months~

In similar tugs and

sta~ts

and stops, the Senate voted

to cut, then to increase parts of foreign a!.d; then to reject it
in toto , only to resuscitate most of the Admir..istra.'tion:s aid
program in two bills a short time later,

un~erscoring

the fact

that foreign aid is a prcgram with more lives than a cat.

"

- 3 Contrary to the appearances, these actions are more
than marches up the hill and

do~m .

They are not empty gestures.

They say what the people of thenation are saying .

In language

which is audible in the other Branches they say that the Senate
wants the war in Viet Nam to end completely and soon.

They say,

too , that the Senate is growing insistent on a sweeping revision
and scale- down of fo r eig,1 aid .
The apparent indecisiveness of the actions arises,
in part, from the fact that there are other centers of federal
power- -in the House and in the Presidency- - wherein other ideas
are held and with which the Senate must come to terms.
also a reflection of a kind of

dil~mma

of power:

It is

it is sympto-

matic of the uncertainty of the Congress in confronting the
salient factor of the contemporary international situation.
I am sure this symposium has long since identified
that factor.
globe.

It is the rurge of change which is sweeping the

From the

rin:l~'"lds

of Asia to the western littoral of

- 4 Europe international relationships of a generation are giving
way; just as currencies , fixed in value for decades, are now
floating, so too are old alliances and alignments.
In this nation, a new outlook is readily detectable.
It is present especially in the young who are not bound by the
fixations of the past but it is by no means confined to the
young.

The international experiences of the past few years

have shocked the thought patterns of the entire nation.
In the United States, the time for a change in foreign
policy is ripe.

If this situation finds a counterpart in the

Soviet Union, then we may well be on the threshhold of the
liquidation of the dubious heritage of the cold war .

Ironically,

the era of cold war is ending not in the "positions of strength,"
which at one time were regarded in

u. s.

policy as an essential

of peace; indeed, the Secretary of Defense has even raised
doubts about the present capacity of our defenses.

Nor is the

cold war clostng Jn drastiC' changes in the state systems of

- 5 Eastern Europe, or the West , which, once in the eyes of more
militant ideologists in both countries, were held to be the
only basis for its ending .
Rather, the heat has been taken out of the cold war,
if I may mix the temperatur es, by degrees .

Old conflicts have

dissolved slowly in symposia such as the one which is taking
place here, to which I allude as symbolic of the growth of
peace~~l

interchange between the two systems.
The old conflicts are also diluted b7 the emergence

of other international

~onsiderations

the purview of the two nations .

which have pressed into

China, for example, no\v looms

large in the concerns of the Soviet Union .

At the same time,

the United States is immersed in the practical and urgent

u~r eats

to the economy, more or less to the exclusion of the theoretical
and distant menaces of alien ideologies.
Ironically~

this transition comes at a time when the

affairs of the nation are presided over by a Republican

- 6 Administration which was once in the front ranks of what was
termed the "battle for the minds of men . "

May I say that the

irony is all to the credit of the incumbent political leadership .

The President has been ahle to set aside the things of

the past .

In the light of present realities, he is acting to

remove some of the bar nac l es which encrus t the foreign policy
of the United States .
Without detracting from the Administration's achievement in any way, I think it is fair to note that the times have
been over - ripe for this change .

I like to think, too , that the

level of reason is such in this nation that the transition mignt
have come under any perceptive administration of whatever
san stripe .
expectation.

But ,

pe r hap~,

par~i-

that is an excessively sanguine

In any event, there is little question of the

general effectiveness of the incumbent Administratior...

It is

&n effectiveness which tends to support Walter Lippmann's thesis
that liberal change is best brought about by conservative
government .

- 7 The critical element in the Administr ation ' s new
approach to international policies , it seems to me , is the
Nixon Doctrine which was unveiled in Guam in 1969.

That Doctrine

set the stage for a diminution of the role which the United
States has played across the spectrum of world affairs for 25
years.

In so doing , it elevated a concept of policy much arti-

culated but little practiced since World War II--that of shared
responsibility for the maintenance of world peace .

The changes

which have been wrought by the Doctrine ar e already evident not
only in Southeast Asia but elsewhere around the globe, as bases
are closed and

u. s.

military forces abroad are reduced .

In some quarters, there is a tendency to see in this
process of military contraction some sor t of shameful furling
of the flag .

Rather, the change is sensible and long overdue .

It acts to reduce the too heavy burdens which have been carried
for too long by the people of the nation often in the vague
name of ''international commitment. ••

Moreover, if the flag has
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Moreover, if the flag has

- 8 been placed by a mistaken policy in places where it does not
belong--as in Indochina--its withdrawal under the Nixon Doctrine
is not only an essential act in our vital national interests, it
is also the only honorable course.

Indeed, if the Doctrine is

to have historic significance in my judgment, it will bring about
not a partial but a complete termination of

u. s.

military involve-

ment in Southeast Asia; that means everywhere on the mainland,
be it in Viet Nam, Cambodia, Laos, or Thailand and by land, sea
and air.

The Doctrine will also provide, if it is to have historic

significance, the rationale for a continuing reduction in our
one- sided military efforts elsewhere in the world, notably, in
\~estern

Europe under NATO.
Notwithstanding the diminution of the U.

presence abroad, the

Unit ~d

s.

military

States is not about to disappear

from the international scene.

This nati on's weight is immense

and it will continue to be felt in many ways and in many places .

•

- 9 That is as desirable as it is inevitable.

Indeed, a sensitive

concern with affairs beyond our borders remains an essential of
the world's civilized survival.

That such is the case argues

strongly for a most judicious use of our resources abroad.

There

is no longer a surplus to be expended in haphazard, almost indiscriminate fashion, for fear that the label of isolation may
otherwise be pinned on our policies.
It is reassuring, therefore, that along with the
military contraction, the omnipresence of

u.

S . economic aid

is also in the process of receding around the globe.

In this

scale-down which affects largely the bilateral programs of aid,
the Senate has played and will continue to play an important
part.

It is to be anticipated that pressure from the Senate

further
will bring about/changes in the basic design of the program.
The fact is that the present system has lost much of
the charisma which was imparted to it by the Marshall Plan} the
Point- Four program and the Peace Corps of another time.

Foreign

•
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aid has become, in recent years, a lavish grab- bag, an international pork barrel, and a world wide arms distribution .

As

presently constituted , the program is an economic drain on the
nation.

More seriously, it has led the United States via the

path of a well- meaning humanitarian generosity into

unwarranted

political and military involvements in the i nner affairs of other
peoples .
It may be that foreign aid can be recast into its
earlier form of people- to- people cooperation .

As it involves

economic development, the program has already moved in large
part out of bilateral channels and into multilateral agencies .
~at

is a welcomed change .

It has the virtue of permitting the

burdens of cost to be shared with other nations .

At the same

time, it insulates this nation from adventures in

~~ilateral

interr.ationalism which can lead, as we have seen in Indochina,
into tragic

en~anglements.

- 11 -

Underlying the new direction in U. S. policies, I
believe, is a growing tendency to view this nation's interests
less in the context of ideological generalities and more in
terms of national well- being and survival.

Viet Nam has alerted

the people to the consequences of a blind pursuit of ideological
obsessions.

The dollar crisis and the dangerous sidetracking

of the nation's inner needs by the demands of the involvement
in Southeast Asia have revealed what lies at the end of the
road of indiscriminate internationalism .

Henceforth, it is

to be expected that the United States will exercise

greate~

discretion in choosing grounds on l-lhich to defend a more
narrowly construed concept of this nation's responsibilities
and interests in the world .
It is essential that the implications of the

nel>~

U. S. approach be considered most carefully by the other
nation whose dilemmas of power are juxtaposed against our
own in this symposium.

indeed, the risks of confrontation
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between the United States and the Soviet Union
may even be increased temporarily by the pr esant contracting
of the U. S. position .

That would be the case if the contrac-

tion led to probings of the new limits of our interests abroad.
If such probings were to occur , they could very well strike
close to the vital considerations of civilized survival.
The effect of a number of other shifts in the balances
of world power must also be considered in this time of transition .
The world is moving away from a bipartite determinism of international politics .

Major questions of war and peace may no

longer rest over\'lhelmingly in the province of the Soviet Union
and the United States .

Now China is emerging as a major power.

So, too , at least in economic terms, is the European Community
and Japan .
With more major nations on the scene , more differencec
to settle and perhaps , more sources of military and nuclear
power to

man:ipulat~J

the problems of peace grow more complex .

- 13 We may find that the risk of conflict increases in proportion
to the rising number of contenders and the broader the diffusion
of international power .
Hopefully, these unhappy possibilities will not come
to pass .

They need not if the dilution of the roles of the

United States and the Soviet Union is accompanied by greater
understanding and restraint between these two nations and timely
adjustment of relationships with third nations.

The United

States and the Soviet Union are i n a unique position at this
point in history.

They are emerging from a protracted pe:r·iod

of mutual antagonism, without having come to a direct military
confrontation.

There is little doubt that the combined strength

of the two nations , in har mony, could assure to them a substantial share in shaping the conditions of peace .

By the same

token, in disharmony: that strength can lead to the ultimate
disaster of nuclear war or, at the least, it could condemn the
possibilities of establishing a
ccme.

d~rable

peace for decades to

- 14 I do not think that this new situation and the oppor··
tunities presented for negotiation have been lost on the Nixon
Administration .

The President , as you know, is pursuing a

policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

He is proceed-

ing on the assumption that many of the differences between the
two governments can now be accommodated and that the inter est
of neither is served by continuing conflict .
In this process , the highest priority should continue
to rest on the negotiations with regard to disarmament .

The

SALT talks have been described by the President as ''the m0st
important arms control negotiations this country has ever
entered."

Their success could provide an inestimable contri-

bution to international stability .

By the same token, however ,

their failure could signal a resumpt ion of the nuclear arms
race at a point of great risk .
The initial indications reveal at least a mutual
w1derstanding of viewpoints and a mutual eagerness to move

- 15 towards agreement .

The Soviet concern is already delineated

as seeking to forestall the

u.

S. deployment of defensive

weapons, that is the anti- ballistics missiles , and to enlarge
the talks to include

u.

S. nuclear weapons which are deployed

at forward bases in Europe and elsewhere within relatively
short-range of Eastern Europe.

On the other hand, the prime

U. S. concern, it is clear, is the desire to limit Soviet
offensive missiles and to maintain our alliances in Europe
and the Far East .
Each of the two governments have acknowledgedthe
priorities of the other.

At least that is a beginning, in

which the cards have been placed on the table.

The candor is

refreshing and provides, in my judgment, some modest basis for
hope to the arms - burdened people of both nations.

In the months

ahead the negotiators will be preoccupied with complex
involving the mathematics of limitation.
United States curb its

deplo~nent

question~

In what way must the

of ARM's and by how much if

- 16 agreement is to be reached?

At What point should there be a

ceiling on offensive Soviet ICBM 1 s or on Soviet missile carrying submarines in order to achieve an agreement?
If the negotiator s find answers to questions of this
kind and an agreement is reached, the Senate will be well pr epared to act on its r esponsibilities with regard to r atification .
Even now , the talks a r e being watched with special inter est in
the Senate .

Just a few weeks ago , I visited the U. S.

Ambassad~r

to the SALT talks who was at that time in Helsinki and, I must
say, was reassured by his optimism.
Beyond disarmament, it seems to me that the two most
complex issues which will confront the Soviet Union and the
United States during this period of transition involve the
relationships with inner Europe, east and west, and with

Chin~.

With respect to China, it seems to me that the President has
taken a highly significant initiative in his decision to go to
Peking .

The visit should not be expected to achieve much in

- 17 the way of substance .

After a lapse of contact for almost a

quarter of a century, however, the very act of going should
open new prospects for building a stable peace in the Western
Pacific.

If these prospects are to Materialize, clearly they

cannot be pursued by the United States in China oblivious to
the concerns of the Soviet Union or Japan.

It would be danger-

ous in the extreme if the path to Peking were to bypass either
Moscow or Tokyo .
In my judgment , a durable pattern of international
stability in East Asia depends upon relations of comity a1nong
all four principal powers.

I am delighted, therefore, that by

the Treaty of Okinawan Reversion, as well as in his brief meeting in Alaska with the Emperor of Japan, the President has
acted to protect-- so to speak- - one fl ank of his peregrination
to the Chinese capital .

At the same time, his announced visit

to Moscow should safeguard the other, especially when it is
coupled with the public assuranc es which he has given that a
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rapprochement between China and the United States is in no

~ay

designed to exacerbate Sino- Soviet difficulties .
It may be that the round of personal contact by
President Nixon will lead subsequently to more tangible results
than meetings of this kind in the past.
remembers Glassboro?

Who, now, for example,

And what was achieved there?

A natural follow - through of the President's visits,
it seems to me, might well be quadrapartite talks on the
maintenance of peace--a peace of the Pacific .

In considering

this question tibere is a need for a franK confrontation of the
four major nations -- Japan, the Soviet Union, China and the
United States --whose power converges in the Western Pacific .
There is also need for greater contact on this question
them and the smaller countries of the region .

betwec~

The clarity of

direct contact can contribute, I believe, to trE stability of
a situation in which the nuclear power of three nations already
converges and where the

techni~al

capacity exists to add a

- 19 fourth input at any

t~te .

Indeed, it would seem that Japan,

alone having chosen to eschew nuclear weapons, might well
take the initiative in calling such a conference.

A quadra-

partite conference might well be designed in the first instance
to seek to bring nuclear dangers --whether in testing or in
potential conflict-- under rational control in the Western
Pacific .
With regard to Europe, negotiations underway and
agreements already achieved appear to be leading to a mere
stable situation.

That progress provides further

ration~le

for the reduction of the military deployments of both the
Soviet Union and the United States .

The circumstances are

trere, I believe, for a new thrust for peace in Europe .

The

present Administration has shown a greater responsiveness to
these

circumsta~ces

than has heretofore been the case .

For

its part, I believe the Soviet Union has given evidence of a
new flexibility in responding aff1rffiatively to the "eastern
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policies" of Chancellor Willy Brandt .

I refer in particular

to the non-aggression pact which the Soviet Union and West
Germany have already initialed and a similar treaty with
Poland wherein West Germany has explicitly accepted the OderNeisse boundary.

Finally, it should be noted that the Soviet

Union has provided, in a four - power agreement, with France,
the United Kingdom and the United States, official acknowledgement of the present status of West Berlin and its ties to
West Germany.
In the light of these agreements as well as the
hopeful

e~anations

from the SALT talks, there is a timely

opportunity for negotiating

mutual and balanced reductions

of forces between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries .
Such reductions might well be over and above what I have
lon ~

since believed can be a unjJatPral draw-down of 50%

in U. S. force levels in Europe .

May I say that I do not

- 21 -

regard the present level of

u.

S . forces in Europe in any

sense as a 'bargaining chip"in negotiating a mutual reduction
of forces

with ~

the Soviet Union .

There is no bargaining

s.

power in the irrelevant; an excessive and antiquated U.

deployment in Europe , and the enormous costs which it entails
cannot strengthen the

u. s.

position in negotiations .

It can

only weaken further the international economic position of
this nation.
Whether the Soviet Union reciprocates or not, there fore, I believe the United States would be well- advised to
make a substantial reduction of its military deployment in
Western Europe .

Indeed , a unilateral initiative in this

connection may even act as a spur to mutual agreement.

I

do not think the Soviet Union will find it practicable to
keep inflated forces in Eastern Europe when there are not
inflated U. S. force levels in Western Europe .

I am reminded

again of Dwight D. Eisenho..,.1er 1 s conclusion that one diYisio!'l

- 22 -

of U. S. forces in Europe would suffice for the purposes cf
the North Atlantic Treaty.
dozen

That conclusion '"'as set for'\.h a

years ago by the first NATO Comma11der but has

been studiously ignored by successive administrations ever
since.
Looking beyond prospective developments in arms
control and the political and military

st~bilization

of Europe,

it seems to me that a major objective of our relat..:..onship \-:i "';h
the Soviet Union should be a substantial increase in economic
interchange .

This nation 1 s trade with the Soviet Union and

the entire Eastern bloc has been held in check for many
~Y

rusty

barri~rs

designed to prevent the shipment of

yea~:s

so - caJ~ed

strategic items to Communist countries.
The present Administration has moved to facilitate
·::.:r:e grmtth of traC:e in non- strategic goods with Eastern E>.1rc;e.
ro;evertheless, the volume of U. S .
remains slender by any measure .

tr~de

\<l.lth the bloc countriee.

E1·en though this trade ross

- 23 now amounts to only seven- tenths of one percent of U. S.
trade with all countries .
Until the advent of the present Administration, the
United States government had been most reluctant to spur
commercial relationships with Eastern Europe.
the Western Europeans have pursued these
for a number of years .

tie~

By contrast ,
with great vigor

In 1969, their combined trade with

Eastern Europe was 15 times that of the United States in
dollar volume .
The potential of East- West trade could be more fully
realized by U. S. business if certain steps were to be taken
at once .

One would be the restoration of equal treatment to

Soviet export commodities and a bill to accomplish this is
now pending in Congress.

Another would be to revise the list

of strategic items to permit American bus1ncss to sell goods
in Eastern Europe which are now freely offered there by other
Nestern nations.

Still another would be to broaden the

- 24 executive waiver power by which prohibitions can be lifted
on financing sales to Eastern European nations through the
Export-Import Bank.

None of these things will necessarily

result in a dramatic upsurge in trade but they might lead
to increasing economic contacts.

Over the long run , that

could do much to strengthen the stability of the SovietU. S. relationship .
Following closely on the heels of trade) is the
\olhole matter of cultural interchange which has so much to do
with the perceptions that the two nations have of each other .
Hopefully, if the people of the United States and the Soviet
Union educate enough of each other's students , listen to
enough of each other ' s musicians , watch each other 's athletes
compete , hold a sufficient number of symposia and so on
through a wide range of activities, they might come to an
in~reased

,n.dP.rstandj ng and apprecj ati on

'fli

reduction in the possibility of conflict .
on ..1hich ot...r cnlturg,l e::change pro

~:ra ,r;

th consequent
That is the

is based .

pre~ise

It seems to

- 25 me to be a sound premise .

Unfortunately, the presant progr am

with the Soviet Union has fallen on hard times for a varlet:· of
reasons, not the least of which have been acts of harassment by
militant groups in this nation.
The Soviet Union and the United States have come

~

long way from the days of the Berlin Blockade, the Hungarian
uprising, the Cuban missile crisis , and the bombastic encounter s
of the 1950's and early 1960's.

We stand now at the threshhcld

of a new era in which many of the suspicions and antagonisms of
the past can be set aside.

President Nixon has an opportunicy

to consolidate this progress, indeed, this progress to which his
Administ~ation

has so gr eatly contributed.

It is a moment of historic opportunity--not in ·cerrr··
of national gain or political profit--but in the opportunity
which is offered to increase the probability of the
vival of modern civilization .

decen~

sur-

If there is any lasting conclusi0n

to which this symposium has led , :

trus~

1t is that

we -- bv~n

na-ri_ons--the Soviet Union and the T"nl ... ed States 3hould not: f,:A.il
J.;o

:.:elze

thi~

opp0::"Gt:.:-::.-ty.

